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Abstract
Knowledge of the relationship between the financial performance of firms within the U.S.
defense industry and the defense spending decisions by the United States Government is an
important domain of research. Greater understanding can enable investors, communities, and
employees to make more informed decisions about investments and/or career choices. In this
work, I examined the financial statements of five major American defense contractors from
1993-1995, 2003-2005, and 2011-2013. Financial performance of these firms was then
correlated with spending actions by the United States Defense Department. Although the
financial sensitivity of these firms on spending decisions by the United States Defense
Department is expected, the extreme sensitivity that was discovered suggests these firms could
benefit by integrating diversification strategies into environments offering counter cyclical
opportunities for revenue and profitability.
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Introduction
Throughout the country’s history, the U.S. government has had a significant impact on the
economy. Whether it be directly or indirectly, many companies rely on governmental spending.
One industry that relies the most on the government is seen in the defense industry, a collection of
corporations that provide military equipment to the U.S. government. This industry has
experienced significant growth ever since the end of the second world war, through mergers and
acquisitions, offering new products and services, and significant competition. Although the
industry has changed in significant ways, one factor seems to be an important factor in the
industry’s growth: Reliance on governmental spending. While it is evident that some level of U.S.
defense spending is responsible for the success of the industry, there is ambiguity concerning how
reliant the industry is on federal funding. Analysis of the defense industry through company annual
reports suggests a moderate reliance on U.S. defense spending. Analyses of the history of company
risk factors related to governmental spending, financial data from the largest defense contractors,
the structure of the companies, and analysis of financial trends suggest that the industry overall
relies moderately on U.S. defense spending, and that there are many other factors to consider when
analyzing the defense industry’s dependence on the U.S. government as a source of revenue.
Size of U.S. Department of Defense
Before beginning to analyze the industry, it is important to contextualize the size and
influence of the Department of Defense, the largest and one of the most important customers for
all major American defense contractors. The Department of Defense has an annual budget of
approximately $716 billion, and employs close to three million people, making it the country’s
largest employer by number of employees (U.S. Department of Defense). This single fact alone
reveals the scale of enormity of the U.S. military. Additionally, the department’s annual budget
underscores how large and influential the governmental organization has become. The size of the
1

budget the Department of Defense receives each year highlights that there are many opportunities
for defense contractors to profit from it. To compare the size of the U.S. military to other countries,
it is important to note how much other countries spend on their military. One study found that
America spends more money on the military than the next seven largest countries combined (Peter
G. Peterson Foundation). This statistic underscores the size of the U.S. military and its budget.
Due to the size of the budget, it is difficult to compare to other nations since there is no country
with a comparable military budget. Since the American defense industry relies on the U.S. military
for funding to some degree, it is also problematic to find a country with a similar defense industry
in size. For these reasons, the American defense industry is difficult to compare to others.
Defense Industry Risks
Analysis of defense contractor’s annual reports over time indicate that U.S. defense
spending is a major determinant of financial success. The first major factor to analyze is the risk
factors that are common within the defense industry. It is typical for companies to list certain risks
that are common in the industry as a whole and risks that are more specific to that company. The
defense industry is no exception to listing certain risk factors in their annual reports. The five
defense contractors to be analyzed include: Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman,
Raytheon, and General Dynamics. These companies are among the largest defense contractors in
the nation, and they all specifically list that they are heavily reliant on the U.S. government as a
source of revenue. These companies also highlight that any abrupt change to the annual defense
budget will hurt them financially. For example, Raytheon’s most recent annual report states: “We
depend on the U.S. government for a substantial portion of our business, and changes in U.S.
government defense spending and priorities could impact our financial position, results of
operations and overall business” (Raytheon Company. Form 10-K for Fiscal Year Ended
December 31, 2019 13). This example specifically states that the corporation relies on the
2

government as a source of revenue, but the report even goes on to say that changes in governmental
spending patterns have the potential to do serious damage to the company’s financial well-being.
Another example that indicates the industry’s reliance on governmental spending is taken from
Lockheed Martin’s 1996 annual report: “Accordingly, a significant portion of the Corporation's
sales are subject to inherent risks, including uncertainty of economic conditions, changes in
government policies and requirements that may reflect rapidly changing military and political
developments and the availability of funds” (Lockheed Martin Corporation. Form 10-K for Fiscal
Year Ended December 31, 1996 12). Even though this statement was issued more than 20 years
ago, it utilizes similar language that other defense contractors are including in their annual reports
today. The statement makes a point of saying that the company is heavily reliant on governmental
spending and would experience financial losses due to sudden policy changes to defense spending.
Despite having been published more than twenty years apart, both reports indicate that reliance on
governmental spending has been an important factor. For these reasons, dependence on
governmental spending has been a constant issue within the industry.
Discretionary Spending Trends Over Time
The annual defense budget is an important factor to consider when analyzing the defense
industry’s dependence on it. Defense spending in the U.S. government falls under the category of
discretionary spending. It is important to consider that “The authority for discretionary spending
stems from annual appropriation acts, which are under the control of the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees” (Congressional Budget Office). The premise of discretionary
spending is that there is more flexibility in what programs receive additional funding. The two
primary components of discretionary spending include defense and nondefense. While defense
concerns all military related activities, “Non-defense spending supports the largest number of
federal agencies and programs, including science and technology research, natural resources,
3

energy, education, and numerous others” (Austin 29). Nondefense spending is a broader category
than defense spending and encompasses various governmental organizations. Despite how diverse
nondefense spending is, discretionary spending is only broken up between these two categories,
indicating the size and significance of the defense budget.
Discretionary spending can be revised through legislative means in the U.S. congress.
Analysis of the history of the U.S. government’s discretionary spending reveals surprising trends.
Analysis of data from the Congressional Budget Office reveals that since 1962, there have been
only 15 instances in which the defense spending in one year was smaller than the previous year
(See figure 1). These instances typically occurred in clusters: The early 1970’s, 1990’s and early
2010’s. Interestingly, nondefense spending only experienced a decrease from the previous year
eight times (See figure 1). These findings indicate that over time, defense spending has
experienced more instances of budgetary cuts than nondefense spending has. This seems to
indicate that defense spending overall is more likely to experience individual budgetary cuts, while
nondefense spending is overall less likely to have its funding cut.
Another reasonable conclusion to make from this data is seen in the funding allocated to
nondefense spending over time. While defense spending has experienced a steady increase in
funding, nondefense spending has grown exponentially. In 1962, the first year of data provided by
the Congressional Budget Office, defense spending made up 72.91% of the nondiscretionary
budget, which was the highest percentage it has ever been to date (See figure 1). In 2019, defense
spending made up approximately 50.61% of the discretionary budget (See figure 1). While this
statistic alone suggests that defense spending growth has been stifled, it is important to consider
that the overall nondiscretionary budget has increased from 72.1 billion in 1962, to 1.3 trillion in
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2019 (See figure 1). This shows that the nondiscretionary budget has grown by more than 1800%
since 1962. The primary reason for the growth in nondefense spending is explained:
Non-defense discretionary spending rose to 4.6% of GDP in 2010 reflecting a decline in
GDP (reducing the denominator of that share) due to the economic recession and policy
responses such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; H.R. 1,
P.L. 111-5). Since that year, non-defense discretionary spending has declined in real terms
and as a percentage of GDP. According to CBO current-law projections, non-defense
discretionary spending will fall to 2.7% in 2023. (Austin 29)
Over time, as the U.S. economy grew, nondefense spending was not increasing proportionately.
Although nondefense spending has been increasing, its relation to the country’s gross domestic
product has decreased over time, suggesting that these governmental programs have been
systematically underfunded for a long period of time. One factor that has stayed the same over the
past 58 years is the fact that defense spending stands out as the single largest discretionary
expenditure. Evidence is seen in the fact that the Congressional Budget Office only differentiates
discretionary spending as being defense and nondefense (See figure 1).
Defense Industry Quantitative Analysis Background: 1990’s, 2000’s and 2010’s
Two major time periods that experienced consistent decreases in defense spending were
the early 2010’s and the early 1990’s. These two time periods will be analyzed in several ways.
First, each period will be analyzed to determine why discretionary spending decreased in these
years. Following contextualization of the appropriate time period several quantitative factors will
be analyzed in relation to five major defense contractors. The five major defense contractors are:
Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon. The first
financial factor to be analyzed is the income statement of each defense contractor, followed by the
5

return on assets of these same companies, and finally the historical stock price of each company.
Each of these factors will help to provide an overall analysis of the defense industry to help
determine if there were any underlying trends occurring within the industry during these time
periods.
Additionally, the 2000’s will be analyzed as well but for different reasons. During this time,
the defense budget grew substantially for several key reasons. In order to ensure as much
consistency as possible, the same five companies will be analyzed during this time, with the same
financial figures. Comparison of these three time periods will allow for an accurate analysis of the
defense industry
Defense Industry Analysis of the 1990’s
Section Introduction
The first time period to be analyzed is the decreases in defense spending during the early
1990’s. In the early to mid-nineties, defense spending decreased consistently from 1992 to 1996
(See figure 2). While there are many factors to consider as to why defense spending decreased,
one study suggests that the fall of the Soviet Union had a significant impact on U.S. spending
throughout the nineties.
The reduced Soviet threat and increased confidence in American military superiority have
led to a substantial rise in sentiment for cutting the defense budget and reducing American
military commitments in Europe. In the fall of 1990 a thin majority of the public (53%)
wanted to maintain the current level of defense spending, while 12% wanted to expand it
and 32% favored reducing it. On the leadership side, 21% preferred to keep it the same,
only 2% wanted to expand, and 77% wanted to cut back, a large shift of 40 percentage
points over a four-year period. (Rielly et al. 86)
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The second half of the 20th century featured the cold war, a time when the United States and the
Soviet Union were vying for influence all over the world through proxy conflicts in other countries.
By the early nineties, America’s largest political, economic, and military rival had collapsed. This
article suggests that the public sentiment in the nineties was to cut defense spending significantly.
As indicated by the data from the Congressional Budget Office, defense spending was cut over a
period of five years (See figure 2). The study also suggests that there was overwhelming public
and political support to decrease military spending, further indicating why the budget decreased
for the Department of Defense. These factors seem to indicate that defense spending was cut
voluntarily, as a result of changes in public opinion about the need for the U.S. military.
Below, all five companies are analyzed in various ways to help determine if there are any
underlying trends that may have existed within the defense industry that suggest how reliant the
companies are on defense spending. The factors that are analyzed concern the earnings of the
companies, return on assets of the companies, and the historical stock price of the companies.
These three factors are meant to analyze the company’s overall financial position and performance
during these years.
General Dynamics
The first company to analyze is General Dynamics, whose earnings report is included
below. Analysis of the company reveals that the company experienced either a small amount of
growth or decreases in profitability during the years analyzed. From 1993 to 1994, the company’s
net income dropped from 885 million dollars to 238 million dollars, a more than seventy-three
percent decrease (See figure 3). This indicates a tremendous loss in profitability for the company
during these years. Although, it is important to note that net income increased from 238 million to
321 million from 1994 to 1995(See figure 3). This represents a slight rebound, indicating that
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General Dynamics was able to recover from the financial distress. This sudden and abrupt shift in
the company’s net income over the years suggests this may have been caused by an industry wide
trend. The company’s annual report stated:
In 1990, U.S. defense budgets, which had been declining since 1985, began falling sharply
in response to the end of the Cold War. Management anticipated that the budget declines
were structural in that, for the foreseeable future, there would be fewer new weapons
systems required which would result in excess capacity in the industry. Accordingly,
management believed there would be a necessary contraction and consolidation of the U.S.
defense industry. To date, management's analysis of these developments has proved to be
true as evidenced by declines, in real terms, in the defense budget and by the number of
industry combinations. (General Dynamics Corporation. Form 10-K for Fiscal Year Ended
December 31, 1995)
The company’s management seemed to suggest that as a result of the defense cuts made after the
fall of the Soviet Union, it was necessary for the defense industry to contract accordingly. The
company’s suggestion from its management that the defense industry would suffer seems to
indicate that they were expecting their earnings to be reduced as a result of budgetary constraints
on the Department of Defense. Additionally, the management’s suggestion that the end of the cold
war contributed to the drop in profitability reinforces the conclusion made by Rielly. Furthermore,
the company’s earnings seemingly reflect management’s notion of an industry wide slowdown
caused by the lack of funding.
The next major financial statistic to consider for General Dynamics is the company’s return
on assets during these years. The return on assets for General Dynamics indicates an alarming
trend for the company. In the three years analyzed, the company’s assets became significantly less
8

productive than in previous years. This trend is especially evident from 1993 to 1994, the
company’s assets became sixty-six percent less productive than before, dropping from 28.71% to
8.97% (See figure 4). This significant drop along with only a small increase in the year after
ultimately suggests that the company was severely affected by the defense budget being cut. The
primary reason for the decrease in the ratio over the years was the significant drop in the company’s
net income over the years, a trend indicated in the company’s income statement. The decreasing
net income caused the company’s assets to be less productive during the time period. For these
reasons, the company’s return on assets largely reflected the company’s financial struggle during
these years.
The final factor to consider is General Dynamics’ historical stock price throughout the
1990’s. It is important to note that at the onset of 1993, the company’s stock price decreased by a
significant amount and experienced little to no growth during this time period. The drop in the
stock price began in 1993, one year after the cuts to defense spending were put in place. General
Dynamics was only able to recover from its high point three years later in 1996 (See figure 5).
This is also the time when defense spending increased for the first time in almost four years. This
graph underscores the notion that General Dynamics was not adequately growing its shareholder
value during these several years, another indication of how the defense budget was influencing the
defense industry. The company’s assertion that the fall of the Soviet Union caused a necessary
contraction in the defense industry seems to be correct for General Dynamics. Over the three years
analyzed, the company’s net income diminished in size, along with its historical stock price. These
ultimately suggest that the company was affected by the cuts to the defense budget.
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Northrop Grumman
Another company to analyze is Northrop Grumman, a company that experienced financial
trends similar to General Dynamics. While typically only 1993 to 1995 are being analyzed, an
analysis of Northrop Grumman from 1991 to 1995 reveal how severely the company’s profitability
diminished over time. According to the company’s income statement, Northrop Grumman
experienced small profit margins for a significant portion of the mid-nineties. From 1991 to 1994,
the company’s profit dropped from 201 million to 35 million (See figure 6). From 1991 to 1994,
Northrop Grumman’s profitability dropped by more than eighty percent over time. It is also
important to note that the company’s profitability rose to 252 million in 1995, indicating that the
company was able to recover from the decreases in profitability (See figure 6). The company noted:
“As a consequence of the end of the Cold War and pressure to reduce the federal budget deficit,
the U.S. defense budget is not expected to increase substantially in the near term. Budget decisions
made in this environment will have long-term consequences for the size and structure of Northrop
Grumman and the entire defense industry” (Northrop Grumman Corporation. Form 10-K for Fiscal
Year Ended December 31, 1995). Similar to General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman noted that
the shrinking defense budget caused the industry to change. The long-term consequence of the
budget changes referred to by Northrop Grumman is seen in that the company’s profits dropped
for several years. This further reinforces the notion that the end of the Cold War and the subsequent
decrease in defense spending caused widespread harm throughout the defense industry.
Another factor to consider is the return on assets of Northrop Grumman during these years.
While the company’s return on assets was noticeably low in the early nineties, the ratio continued
to decrease as the years progressed and defense funding decreased. One significant decrease is
seen in 1993 to 1994 when the ratio decreased from 3.15% to .78% (See figure 7). This drastic
decrease ultimately suggests that the company’s assets were becoming significantly less
10

productive over time. From 1993 to 1994, Northrop Grumman more than doubled its assets (See
figure 7). One reason the company’s assets grew is because of Northrop Corporation’s merger with
Grumman Corporation. The merger between the two companies highlights that “Faced with drastic
cuts in military spending, weapons contractors have adopted a strategy of acquiring businesses in
markets they can dominate and selling off the rest” (Sims). This seems to suggest that the company
was able to rebound as a result of the company’s acquisition of Grumman Corporation. While the
acquisition did partially help the company, this notion seems to suggest that the company was
severely affected by the drop in defense funding.
Northrop Grumman’s historical stock price is an important indicator that the company may
have been affected by cuts to the U.S. defense budget. Similar to General Dynamics, Northrop
Grumman’s stock price experienced little to no growth during the years the defense budget was
being cut. Only in late 1995 did the company begin to greatly expand its shareholder value (See
figure 8). This stagnant growth is another indicator of a defense contractor struggling financially
to maintain its profitability as a result of the change in the U.S. defense budget. Further indication
of the company being affected by the drop in defense funding is seen in the second half of the
nineties when the company’s stock price more than doubled by 1997 (See figure 8). This indicates
that Northrop Grumman was able to increase its shareholder value in the years after the cuts to the
defense budget.
Lockheed Martin
Another company to analyze during this period is Lockheed Martin, a company that also
experienced significant changes to its profitability during the mid-nineties. Similar to Northrop
Grumman, Lockheed Martin’s financials will be analyzed from 1991 to 1995 to showcase
significant financial trends that occurred within the company. From 1991 to 1995, Lockheed
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Martin’s profits ranged significantly: a net loss of 361 million in 1992 to a high of 1,018 million
in 1994 (See figure 9). Additionally, in the other years analyzed, the company’s net income was
not stable and varied significantly from year to year. These significant changes in the company’s
profitability indicate how unstable the company’s financials were during this time. One important
factor to consider is that Lockheed Martin’s earnings from operations decreased by twenty-seven
percent from 1994 to 1995, despite the overall upward trend in the years analyzed (See figure 9).
This suggests that Lockheed’s profit margins decreased significantly during this time period.
Lockheed’s financial profitability in these years is addressed in the company’s annual report. The
company stated: “The facts in this case are that major layoffs in this industry are driven by declines
in the defense budget and would probably have been much greater if not for restructuring actions
that, quite literally, let companies like Lockheed Martin grow while budgets shrink”( Lockheed
Martin Corporation. Form 10-K for Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 1996 5). The company
specifically stated that the main reason for the company’s profitability despite budgetary
constraints from the federal government is the major restructuring that occurred during this time.
Lockheed noted that it closed numerous facilities down in order to reduce their costs and
reorganize themselves during this time, allowing the company to maintain its profit margins. For
this reason, the company was able to avoid financial ruin caused by the changes in U.S. defense
spending.
Another factor to consider for Lockheed Martin is the company’s return on assets during
these years. Similar to its profitability, Lockheed Martin experienced significant volatility in the
productivity of its assets. In 1992, the company’s return on assets was -3.38%, but increased to a
more consistent ratio of slightly less than six percent in the years following (See figure 10). One
major reason for the company’s return on assets being able to recover is seen in that the company’s
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assets rose from 10,827 to 17,082 in one year (See figure 10). The primary reason for this rapid
growth in the company’s assets is because of a series of mergers and acquisitions the company
entered into during this time. “Since 1993, the Corporation has made several strategic acquisitions
and alliances which affect many facets of its business, including tactical military aircraft
production, space launch systems and defense and commercial electronics” (Lockheed Martin
Corporation. Form 10-K for Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 1996 55). The primary reason for
the company being able to partially maintain its return on assets during this time was the numerous
mergers and acquisitions that occurred throughout the nineties in response to the decrease in
defense funding. It is also important to note that the company was experiencing volatile levels of
net income during these years, further contributing to the company’s financial instability brought
about by the defense budget change.
Lockheed Martin’s historical stock price further suggests an underlying trend in the
financial performance of the defense industry during the nineties. Lockheed Martin’s historical
stock price indicates little to no growth during the nineties. From 1993 to 1995, the company’s
stock price remained largely the same at approximately twenty dollars (See figure 11). The
company’s stagnant growth during this time further supports the notion that the cutting of the
defense budget had some impact on the financial performance of the companies in the defense
industry. Another observation that supports this notion is seen in the fact that the company’s stock
price more than doubled in the second half of the decade (See figure 11). This trend of a rising
stock price is seen in the other two defense contractors that have been analyzed so far. This seems
to suggest that there were industry trends preventing the company from growing its shareholder
value.
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Boeing
Another major company to analyze during this time period is Boeing, a major defense
contractor in the United States. While five major defense contractors were analyzed, Boeing was
the largest in terms of revenue. For this reason, it is important to analyze how the company
performed in the 1990’s. Analysis of the company reveals that the company’s earnings decreased
significantly in all three years. From 1993 to 1995 the company’s revenues decreased from 25,438
to 19,515, a decrease of twenty-three percent (See figure 12). Another important factor to consider
is that from 1993 to 1995, the company’s net earnings decreased by approximately sixty-eight
percent (See figure 12). These figures ultimately suggest the company’s profitability significantly
diminished during this time period; a trend prevalent in the companies that have been analyzed.
In agreement with the company’s financial performance, Boeing’s return on assets indicate
that the company was becoming less profitable during this time period. From 1992 to 1995,
Boeing’s return on assets went from 9.12% to 1.80%, decreasing each year (See figure 13). The
primary determinant for the decreasing ratio was the company’s rising assets and diminishing
profits. This further indicates that the company was severely impacted by the change in U.S.
defense spending. Unlike Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, Boeing did not actively seek
out any major mergers and acquisitions during this time period. Boeing stated,
Significant restructuring in the form of mergers, acquisitions and strategic alliances are
continuing throughout the industry as a result of the reduced opportunities for new
programs. Internal consolidations and restructuring of the Company's defense and space
operations have helped position the Defense & Space Group to effectively compete in the
current market environment. (Boeing Company. Form 10-K for Fiscal Year Ended
December 31, 1995 34)
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Boeing explained that the trends occurring within the defense industry were causing widespread
consolidations. The company also mentioned that one of its own company divisions sought to
restructure itself in order to adapt to these industry changes. This indicates that the company was
still affected by the changes in federal funding. For this reason, the company’s net income and
return on assets were decreasing each year analyzed during this time period.
Boeing’s historical stock price reveals how drastically the company was affected. From
1992 to 1995, Boeing’s stock price either decreased or remained largely the same (See figure 14).
The stock was only able to rebound in 1996 and subsequently rise. It is also important to note that
this was the final year of the decrease in funding to the defense budget possibly suggesting there
was a correlation between the decreased funding and the financial performance of the defense
industry. It is also important to note how quickly Boeing’s stock recovered in 1996 a trend
prevalent in all the companies that have been analyzed so far. This further indicates a broader trend
within the industry since other defense contractors’ stock prices also began to rise around this time.
Raytheon
The final company to analyze is Raytheon. Unlike all the other corporations analyzed up
to this point, Raytheon’s financials seem largely unchanged over the years analyzed. Similar to
Lockheed Martin, Raytheon decided to restructure itself in order to avoid financial ruin. In the
company’s annual report, Raytheon stated: “The company recorded in the first quarter of 1994 a
restructuring provision of $249.8 million before tax. The restructuring was driven by the
significant reductions in the defense budget and increasing commercial competition” (Raytheon
Company. Form 10-K for Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 1995). Raytheon decided to be
proactive in adapting to the changing economic conditions that were becoming prevalent in the
defense industry as a result of the shrinking defense budget. From 1993 to 1995, Raytheon’s net
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income rose from 693 million, to 793 million, an increase of more than fourteen percent (See figure
15). Over the three years analyzed, Raytheon was able to grow its revenues and maintain its
profitability.
Raytheon’s return on assets suggests that the company was struggling to maintain its profit
margins. Over the three-year period analyzed, Raytheon’s total assets increased by more than
thirty-five percent (See figure 16). While the company’s net income may have grown, the growth
of the company’s assets outpaced any increase in profitability. This ultimately indicates that the
company’s assets were becoming less profitable over time. It is important to note that even though
the company took proactive measures to prepare itself for the decreasing defense budget, the
company’s financials were still affected by the change.
The final factor to consider is Raytheon’s historical stock price during this time period.
Throughout the nineties, Raytheon experienced a similar trend prevalent in the defense industry
during this time. From 1992 to 1995, the company’s stock price remained largely the same,
remaining at approximately 30 dollars per share (See figure 17). Raytheon’s stock price during the
years analyzed further reinforces the notion of an underlying trend that occurred within the defense
industry during this time. This trend of a stagnant stock price among the defense contractors reveals
that even companies that were proactive in adjusting to the industry trends were not able to grow
the value of their stock.
Conclusion of 1990’s Analysis
Analysis of the financial performance of these five defense contractors suggests there were
underlying trends that caused significant upheaval to their financials. The results from these
findings ultimately suggest that the financials of the companies analyzed were adversely affected
by cuts to the U.S. defense budget. The end of the cold war brought about legislation that decreased
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defense spending over a five-year period. The years in which the U.S. defense budget decreased
corresponded with poor financial performance for most defense contractors analyzed. In addition
to the company’s poor financial performance, the historical stock prices from the time experienced
stagnant growth. Furthermore, the stock price of all defense contractors significantly increased
around the same time, around late 1995 and 1996, a time when funding for the defense budget
began to increase again. This recovery in the stock price, along with analysis of the company’s
financial performance and return on assets suggest that the defense industry was largely reliant on
funding from the government for continued growth and success.
Defense Industry Analysis of the 2010’s
Section Introduction
The second major time period of defense cuts is seen in the early 2010’s. A primary
difference between these two time periods is seen in the different motives for cutting the defense
budget. While the defense cuts in the 1990’s were only defense related, the budget cuts from the
2010’s were related to all forms of discretionary spending (See figure 1). As indicated by the data
provided from the Congressional Budget Office, discretionary spending overall was decreasing.
The cuts that were made to the defense budget during this time featured specific cuts to individual
projects.
Rather than addressing the yawning gap in resources, the administration moved to “fix”
the problem by eliminating planned spending and procurements; rather than increasing
budgets to adequately fund requirements, it shrank the requirements. During the
administration’s first three years, it cut nearly $500 billion out of current and future
budgets. As a result, more than 30 defense programs were canceled, capped, or ended—.
(The Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies 64-5)
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The budget cuts made to defense during this time featured decreased funding to both projects that
were currently in progress, and projects that were being planned. This significant and sudden cut
to defense spending suggests this may have been an indicator of the financial performance of
defense contractors during this time. Additionally, since these defense cuts involved all types of
defense projects, from works in progress to planned projects, the effects seemed to have a
significant impact on the defense industry.
Before analyzing these five companies, it is important to consider what caused many of the
federal budget cuts to occur, and what differentiates these cuts from the cuts made in the 1990’s.
The piece of legislation that sought to reduce spending during this time period, was the Budget
Control Act of 2011. “Very generally, the spending reductions are to be made equally from defense
spending and from all other spending (referred to as “nondefense spending”). The reductions
required in each of these categories are then divided proportionally between discretionary spending
and mandatory spending” (Heniff et al. 3). This is an important factor in the legislation in that all
discretionary programs experienced a decrease in funding. This is the factor that is fundamentally
different from the defense cuts of the 1990’s. The defense cuts in the 1990’s only decreased
funding to defense related projects, which was caused by the fall of the Soviet Union. The Budget
Control Act however, reduced funding to government organizations, defense, and nondefense
alike. This seems to suggest that the legislation was implemented to control governmental
spending in general, rather than control only military spending. For these reasons, there is a
possibility that the financial performance of the five companies will be different from when the
same companies were analyzed in the 1990’s.
Similar to the analysis of the five major defense contractors during the 1990’s, the same
five companies will be analyzed, this time from 2011 to 2013. The objective of this analysis is to
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determine if the financials of the companies were hindered as a result of the budget cuts from the
federal government. The income statement of the companies will be analyzed, along with the return
on assets, and the historical stock price of the companies. These key factors will then be compared
to see if there are any underlying trends that signify that the financial performance of the companies
is related to these proposed budget cuts.
General Dynamics
The first company that will be analyzed during this time is General Dynamics. Over the
three years analyzed, General Dynamics experienced decreasing revenues and increasing costs. As
a result of these decreasing revenues and increasing expenses, the company experienced a net loss
of 332 million in 2012 (See figure 18). Additionally, the company’s net income in 2013 was six
percent lower than it was in 2011, suggesting a downward trend in the company’s profitability
(See figure 18). Similar to its financial performance in the 1990’s, General Dynamics’ financial
performance worsened the same time cuts to the defense budget occurred. The company stated in
its annual report that part of the reason for the poor financial performance is seen in the budgetary
cuts made by the federal government. “Over the past several years, U.S. defense spending has been
reduced, due in part to the country’s fiscal shortfall. To address this shortfall, the Budget Control
Act of 2011 (BCA) mandated a $487 billion, or 8 percent, reduction to previously planned defense
funding over 10 years” (General Dynamics Corporation. Form 10-K for Fiscal Year Ended
December 31, 2013 25). The company’s management specifically described how the Budget
Control Act affected the company. As a result of the Budget Control Act, many defense programs
had their funding cut. One consequence of this legislation was General Dynamics’ poor
performance. This seems to suggest that the policy had a direct impact on the company’s financial
prospects in the present and in the future, since General Dynamics had many long-term contracts
with the Department of Defense.
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The second factor to consider is return on assets for General Dynamics. As a result of the
company’s poor financial performance in 2012, the return on assets was -.96% (See figure 19). In
addition to the negative ratio in 2012, from 2011 to 2013, the company’s ratio did not fully recover
in 2013 (See figure 19). Even though the company became profitable in 2013, the return on assets
indicates that the company was not able to financially recover from the previous year and overall
decline in net income over time. Overall, the company’s return on assets indicates that General
Dynamics was affected by the recession.
The final factor to consider is the historical stock price of General Dynamics throughout
the 2010’s. It is important to note that the company experienced a significant drop in the value of
its share price in 2011(See figure 20). The price only recovered its original value approximately
two years later in 2013(See figure 20). This reveals that the company’s shareholders were affected
by the sudden decrease in the company’s profitability during this time. It is also important to note
that the company’s stock price has been able to increase steadily after 2013, suggesting that the
lack in federal funding was hindering the company’s growth during this time.
Northrop Grumman
The second company to analyze is Northrop Grumman, a company that experienced a
tremendous amount of growth since the 1990’s. From 2011 to 2013, the company experienced a
steady decline in its net income, dropping from 2,118 million to 1,952 million (See figure 21). One
of the primary contributors to this decrease is seen in the company’s shrinking revenues. While
costs were largely stabilized, the decreasing revenues seemed to damage the company. The
company also referred to the economic impact of the Budget Control Act.
While we believe that our business is well-positioned in areas that the Department of
Defense (DoD) has indicated are areas of focus for future defense spending, the long-term
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impact of the Budget Control Act, other defense spending cuts, and the ongoing fiscal
debates remain uncertain and our business and industry could be materially adversely
affected. (Northrop Grumman Corporation. Form 10-K for Fiscal Year Ended December
31, 2013 9)
Compared to General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman was not severely affected by the defense
cuts. This statement from the company’s management suggests there are many consequences from
the Budget Control Act that have not yet affected the defense industry. The company also
suggested that while Northrop Grumman’s financial performance was not drastically affected,
businesses that did business with Northrop Grumman could potentially inhibit the company’s
future success.
The second major financial indicator to analyze is the company’s return on assets. As
mentioned earlier, Northrop Grumman was not seriously harmed by the defense cuts. Further
evidence of this is that the company’s return on assets remained largely the same throughout the 3
years analyzed at approximately 7.5% (See figure 22). This is a direct contrast to General
Dynamics, who experienced a negative return on assets at one point during the three-year analysis.
This further suggests the financial burden was not placed directly on Northrop Grumman, as the
company was able to maintain its profitability.
Northrop Grumman’s historical stock price indicates how the company reacted to the
changes in defense spending from the federal government. Similar to General Dynamics, Northrop
Grumman’s share price experienced a slight decrease starting in 2011, and only rebounded in 2013
(See figure 23). After 2013, the company’s share price more than tripled in the years following
(See figure 23). This ultimately suggests the company was not able to maintain its profitability for
the shareholders of the company. This also builds on the prior indication from the company’s
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income statement that Northrop Grumman was not able to maintain its profit margins because of
the Budget Control Act of 2011.
Lockheed Martin
The third company to analyze is Lockheed Martin. This company was largely unaffected
by the federal budget cuts during this time. Despite the company’s ability to remain profitable,
Lockheed Martin mentions the implications of the Budget Control Act of 2011, and stated: “The
impacts of sequestration in GFY 2013 were less than originally expected due to congressional
actions that reduced the cuts as well as the DoD’s ability to allocate a portion of the reductions to
prior year unobligated balances and multi-year investment appropriations. Accordingly, we have
experienced minimal impacts to date” (Lockheed Martin Corporation. Form 10-K for Fiscal Year
Ended December 31, 2013 10). Lockheed was able to avoid financial ruin during this time because
of many long-term contracts the company had entered into, ultimately contributing to the
company’s success. Additionally, the company’s financials reveal that Lockheed was largely
unaffected by the budget cuts, as the company’s profits increased by more than twelve percent
during the years analyzed (See figure 24). This ultimately suggests Lockheed was able to maintain
its profitability during this time period.
The second financial factor to consider is Lockheed Martin’s return on assets during this
time period. Building on recent observations from the company, Lockheed Martin’s return on
assets further indicates that the company’s financial performance was largely unaffected by the
budgetary cuts on the federal level. From 2011 to 2013, Lockheed Martin’s return on assets grew
in each subsequent year or remained largely the same (See figure 25). While the company’s assets
were decreasing each year, profits continued to rise, ultimately suggesting the company was
maintaining its profitability margins despite financial burdens.
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Lockheed Martin’s historical stock price indicates the company did not experience as much
loss as General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman did during this time. The company’s stock price
however remained largely the same from 2011 to 2013 (See figure 26). This ultimately indicates
that although Lockheed Martin was able to maintain its profit margins during the three years
analyzed, the company’s shareholder value remained largely the same. This suggests a trend that
the corporations in the defense industry were affected by the changes in the defense industry. This
lack of growth seems to indicate the company was still affected by the Budget Control Act.
Boeing
The fourth company to analyze is Boeing. Boeing also experienced only a decrease in
profits during these three years. The company’s revenues grew during these three years, suggesting
that the company was not significantly affected by the federal budget cuts. It is important to note
however that profits decreased from 2011 to 2012 but recovered in 2013 (See figure 27). This
ultimately suggests that the company was affected by the budget cuts made in 2011. Boeing
addressed this in their annual report by stating: “The impact of sequestration cuts was reduced with
respect to FY2014 and FY2015 following the enactment of The Bipartisan Budget Act in
December 2013” (Boeing Company. Form 10-K for Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2013 8).
This piece of legislation requires further examination demonstrating how influential the
government is on the defense industry. Boeing seemed to suggest the company was able to
maintain its profitability margin because the government decided to renew its commitments to
many of its long-term projects it had entered in the past. The company however mentioned that
the Budget Control Act implemented long term changes to the company’s future growth potential.
For these reasons, the company’s annual report suggested this was the reason Boeing did not
decrease its profitability over time.
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The second financial figure to analyze is the company’s return on assets. The only indicator
that Boeing was affected by the federal budget cuts is the decrease in the company’s return on
assets from 2011 to 2012 (See figure 28). The reason for the decrease was that the company’s net
income growth did not match the growth of the assets during this time period. The company’s
assets during this time increased by more than fifteen percent, outpacing the growth of Boeing’s
net income. This ultimately suggests that while Boeing was remaining profitable, its assets were
becoming less efficient at generating a profit.
The historical stock price of Boeing indicates a pattern similar to Lockheed. While
Boeing’s income statement was not significantly affected by the lack in federal funding, the
company’s share price dropped and did not grow from 2011 to 2013 (See figure 29). This trend is
similar to General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman’s share price during this time. This further
indicates an industry wide trend that occurred in the years following the passage of the Budget
Control Act of 2011. This significant lack in growth in the company’s share price indicates Boeing
was still affected by indirect changes to the defense industry.
Raytheon
The fifth company to analyze is Raytheon. Throughout the three years analyzed, Raytheon
was able to maintain its profitability. It is important to note however, that the company did
experience a slowdown in 2012 when the company’s profits only increased by only one percent
from the previous year (See figure 30). This suggests Raytheon may have been affected by the
federal cuts to defense by a small marginal amount. Raytheon made no specific mention describing
how the Budget Control Act may have affected the company’s financial performance. The
company did, however, make note of how this piece of legislation affected the Department of
Defense and the defense industry. “U.S. Government appropriations have and likely will continue
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to be affected by larger U.S. Government budgetary issues and related legislation” (Raytheon
Company. Form 10-K for Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2013 12). Raytheon mentioned how
broadly the implications of this legislation affected the industry, and how it had already caused
widespread change.
The second financial figure to analyze is the company’s return on assets. Over the threeyear period analyzed, Raytheon was largely unaffected, as the company largely maintained its
return on assets at approximately 7.5% (See figure 31). In 2012, there was a slight decrease from
the previous year, but the ratio recovered in the following year. This ultimately indicates the
company was largely unaffected by the changes in policy, and its ability to maintain its profit
margins was unchanged. It is important to note that Raytheon was able to maintain its profitability
throughout the nineties as well, suggesting that the company has been able to adequately respond
to changes throughout the industry over time.
Raytheon’s historical stock price indicates the company was still affected by the federal
defense cuts despite its profitability. From 2011 to 2013, Raytheon’s stock price either decreased
or remained the same during this time at a price of 50 dollars per share (See figure 32). This seems
to indicate that, similar to the other companies analyzed during this time, Raytheon was still
indirectly affected by the Budget Control Act of 2011. It is also important to note that the
company’s share price not only grew in 2013 but began to rise at an unprecedented rate (See figure
32). This seems to suggest that the company’s growth was restrained as a result of the budget cuts.
Conclusion of 2010’s Analysis
Although all five companies experienced various degrees of change to their financials as a
result of the Budget Control Act of 2011, it is important to address why the companies were able
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to recover in 2013. One reason the defense contractors were able to recover was legislation was
passed in 2013: The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013.
Both the American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA, P.L. 112-240) and Bipartisan Budget Act
(BBA, P.L. 113-67) eased the path of meeting defense spending limits in the near-term.
Together, these acts provided defense with an additional $54 billion for FY2012-FY2015,
reducing ten-year savings required from the FY2012 President’s Budget plan by 1%.
(Belasco 52)
This piece of legislation was meant to reduce the limitations imposed by the Budget Control Act
of 2011. This amended many of the restrictions that were in place to limit the growth of the defense
budget. By amending the Budget Control Act of 2011, there was potential for defense funding to
increase. Passage of this new piece of legislation occurred around the same time all the stock prices
for the companies analyzed recovered from 2011 to 2013, when there was little to no growth. This
seems to suggest the speculation defense funding would increase would lead to increased revenues
and profits for the defense contractors. For this reason, it is important to consider that the Bipartisan
Budget Act suggests a possible correlation between increased defense spending and growth in the
stock prices of defense contractors.
After carefully analyzing financial data of these five companies from 2011 to 2013, several
trends are noticeable. While some companies performed worse than others, there is a constant that
has arisen as a result of this. All companies analyzed were, in varying degrees, financially affected
by the Budget Control Act of 2011. Three of the five companies analyzed experienced a drop in
their net income: Boeing, General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman at some point during the
three years analyzed. All companies at one-point experienced decreasing return on assets, in
varying degrees, throughout the three years analyzed. Additionally, the stock price of all five
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companies analyzed experienced little to no growth during these three years analyzed. This
ultimately reveals the companies were affected by the lack in federal funding. This assertion is
supported by the fact that all five companies noted their reliance on federal funding, and all these
companies specifically mention the Budget Control act of 2011 in their annual reports. For these
reasons, legislation such as the Budget Control Act suggest some correlation with financial
performance of the defense industry.
Defense Industry Analysis of the 2000’s
Section Introduction
After analyzing the defense industry during periods of decreased funding, it is important
to analyze these same companies during years where defense spending was increasing. One
example of this is seen in the 2000’s, a decade that had no decreases in defense spending from the
previous years (See figure 1). The three specific years to be analyzed are 2003, 2004 and 2005.
The same five companies will be analyzed during this time to determine if there is a correlation to
subsequent years of increased funding. Similar to the other time periods mentioned, it is relevant
to analyze why defense spending increased during this time. One key answer to this is seen in the
outbreak of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000’s. “In the aftermath of the attacks
on 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the defense budget did of course increase. From
2001 to 2009, total spending grew by 73 percent in real terms, but much of that increase was tied
to fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan” (The Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies 64).
The United States significantly increased defense spending in response to the terrorist attacks on
9/11, in addition to the country’s invasion of Iraq. The U.S. response to the terrorist attacks
indicates the leading factor responsible for the increased funding.
In order to ensure consistency, the same five companies that have been analyzed, will be
analyzed as well. The primary objective of analyzing these companies is to determine if there is
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an underlying trend that suggests increased defense spending will lead to increased profitability
within the defense industry. The income statements, the return on assets, and the historical stock
prices of the five companies will be analyzed. The years that will be analyzed are 2003 to 2005.
General Dynamics
The first company to be analyzed is General Dynamics. From 2003 to 2005, the defense
contractor’s profits rose from 1,004 million to 1,461 million, an increase of more than forty-five
percent (See figure 33). This was a significant increase in the company’s profitability over a short
amount of time. This rapid growth in profitability seems to suggest that there were multiple factors
that were allowing the company to become so profitable. The company’s management made note
of the increase to defense spending.
For fiscal year 2006, the Congress appropriated $411 billion for the Department of
Defense, a 33 percent increase in funding since 2001. This amount includes $147 billion
for procurement and research and development (R&D) activities, an increase of 43 percent
since 2001. Procurement and R&D budgets, also known as investment accounts, provide
the majority of the company’s revenues and, over the past several years, these budget lines
have enjoyed sustained increases that demonstrate continued administration and
congressional support. (General Dynamics Corporation. Form 10-K for Fiscal Year Ended
December 31, 2005 19)
General Dynamics’ management stated that increased funding to the defense budget, and more
specifically, increased funding to research and development contributed to the company’s recent
success. This also reveals that most of the company’s profits were attributed to research and
development costs from the defense budget. Additionally, the continued political support for the
defense budget seems to indicate the company’s management expected success over a long period
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of time, provided the defense budget continued to increase. These factors seem to suggest increased
funding was a determinant of the company’s financial success.
The notion that increased defense spending was a determinant of a defense contractors’
success is supported by the company’s return on assets in these years. In all three years, General
Dynamics was able to increase its ratio from 7.19% to 7.87% (See figure 34). Both the company’s
net income and total assets were increasing proportionately throughout these years, suggesting the
company was able to maintain its profitability margins. Additionally, the growing return on assets
seems to indicate the company was able to be more profitable than the year prior, further indicating
the growth of the company.
The third and final factor to consider for General Dynamics is the historical stock price
throughout the decade. The company’s historical stock price during this time seems to suggest
General Dynamics was able to maintain steady levels of growth in the company’s shareholder
value. Overall, the stock price steadily rose for most of the decade, more than doubling in value in
the three years analyzed (See figure 35). The company’s management made an important note to
explain that funding for the Department of Defense contributed to the company’s profitability.
“The current Administration’s desire to modernize U.S. military forces coupled with the U.S.
military’s engagement in the Global War on Terrorism has driven steady Department of Defense
funding increases since 2001” (General Dynamics Corporation. Form 10-K for Fiscal Year Ended
December 31, 2005 19). This suggests the company’s success in recent years was driven by the
increased funding to the Department of Defense during these years from the federal government.
Additionally, this further reinforces the notion stated earlier that the increased defense funding
allowed the company to become significantly more profitable than before.
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Northrop Grumman
The second company to analyze during this time period is Northrop Grumman. Similar to
General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman also experienced three successive years of increased
revenue and profitability, with profits increasing more than sixty percent over the three years
analyzed (See figure 36). In each subsequent year, revenues were able to outpace the company’s
costs, leading to a significant increase in profitability. Northrop Grumman’s management stated:
U.S. defense contractors have benefited from the upward trend in overall defense spending
over recent years. While the current U.S. defense budget forecast shows a slower rate of
growth than in prior years, and certain programs in which the company participates may
be subject to potential reductions, the company believes that its portfolio of technologically
advanced, innovative products, services, and solutions in systems integration, defense
electronics, information technology, advanced aircraft, shipbuilding, and space technology
will generate revenue growth in 2006 and beyond. (Northrop Grumman Corporation. Form
10-K for Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2005 24)
This assertion by the company’s management showcases a new trend to consider for the company.
Although Northrop Grumman had been relying primarily on the Department of Defense for
funding, the company was searching for alternative sources of revenue in order to diversify itself.
This is a common trend in the defense industry, as the companies continue to diversify themselves
in order to grow their revenue streams and to search for new potential customers and industries to
provide products and services to. This could also explain why the company’s profits increased in
such a short amount of time.
The second financial figure to analyze is the company’s return on assets during this time.
Analysis of the company’s return on assets ratio indicates significant growth for the company.
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From 2003 to 2005, the company’s ratio increased from 2.3% to 4.10%, an increase of more than
eighty percent (See figure 37). The primary contributor to this was that the company’s net income
grew over the three years analyzed. This observation suggests the company has been able to make
its assets more profitable. Additionally, the ratio also indicates that the company’s increasing
profits reflect that the company became more efficient over time.
The final factor to consider is Northrop Grumman’s historical stock price. During the three
years analyzed, Northrop Grumman experienced steady growth in its stockholder price. The
company’s share price increased by approximately 30% during this time (See figure 38). This
consistent growth is most similar to General Dynamics, suggesting an industry wide trend that was
prevalent during this time. This seems to indicate that the company’s continuous profitability
reflects growth in the company’s shareholder value, a trend that also occurred during this time for
General Dynamics.
Lockheed Martin
The third company to analyze is Lockheed Martin. Similar to the past two companies
analyzed during this time period, Lockheed Martin also experienced steady growth in its
profitability. Lockheed Martin’s revenues grew at steady rates and the company was able to
significantly grow its net income throughout the year. Lockheed Martin’s net income increased
from 1,053 million to 1,825 million, an increase of more than seventy percent (See figure 39).
Similar to Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin’s management also
described the impact of the increased funding.
We and other U.S. defense contractors have benefited from an upward trend in overall
defense spending in the last few years. The defense investment budget includes funds for
weapons procurement and research and development. The Future Years Defense Plan
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submitted with the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2007 projects a strong
commitment to research and development of transformational capabilities across the
military services, while reducing quantities of near-term systems compared to previous
projections. (Lockheed Martin Corporation. Form 10-K for Fiscal Year Ended December
31, 2005 24)
The company’s management made note that the increased funding to research and development
contributed to the increased profitability of the company during this time period. Additionally, the
expectation of increased funding in the future was a major indicator of future financial performance
for defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin. It is also interesting to note that General
Dynamics explained that increased research funding drove profits for the company as well. This
seems to indicate a trend that increased funding towards research resulted in increased profits for
defense contractors.
Lockheed Martin’s return on assets indicates that the company was able to maintain its
profitability levels as well. From 2003 to 2005, Lockheed was able to increase its return on assets
by a significant margin, from 3.96% to 6.85% (See figure 40). This is a significant indicator of the
company’s ability to generate a profit since the company’s assets were becoming more profitable
over time. The company’s increasing net income was outpacing the growth of average assets over
the years, therefore increasing the ratio. The ratio also suggests that there was a trend within the
defense industry of increased profitability.
The final financial figure to analyze is the company’s historical stock price. Similar to the
past two companies analyzed, Lockheed’s stock price grew at a steady rate, further reinforcing the
notion that the company was able to maintain its profitability margins over time (See figure 41).
Additionally, this also highlights that the company was beneficial to its stockholders, since the
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share price was increasing over the time period analyzed. The increasing stock price further
suggests an industry trend of growth in stock prices among defense contractors in response to the
sudden rise in defense spending.
Boeing
The fourth company to analyze is Boeing Company. Similar to the other companies
analyzed, Boeing’s net income increased by a significant amount during the three years analyzed.
From 2003 to 2005, Boeing more than tripled its net income from 718 million to 2,572 million
(See figure 42). The company’s growth is most evident in that revenue growth outpaced the growth
of the accompanying costs over time. This rapid growth of the company’s profits suggests that the
company was benefitting from trends within the industry. This trend involves the defense industry
growing at unprecedented rates to meet the demand of the U.S. government in response to the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Another example that supports the notion that Boeing’s success is a result of the increased
defense funding is seen in the company’s return on assets. Similar to the company’s net income,
Boeing’s return on assets more than tripled over the three years analyzed (See figure 43). Growth
in this ratio came about because the company’s net income more than tripled over the three years
while the company’s assets did not match this level of growth. This seems to suggest that over
time, the company’s assets were becoming more profitable.
The third factor to consider is Boeing’s historical stock price over time. Similar to the other
three companies analyzed during this time, Boeing’s stock price also increased steadily throughout
most of the 2000’s, more than doubling in the three years analyzed indicating the stability of the
company and the defense industry during this time (See figure 44). Additionally, Boeing’s
increasing stock price also indicates the company was able to maintain its profit margins for its
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investors, raising the shareholder’s value in the company. Boeing’s management stated: “The DoD
budget has grown substantially over the past decade, particularly after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, and we’ve seen that trend continue in the 2007 Presidential budget submittal,
although at a moderated rate compared to the last few years”( Boeing Company. Form 10-K for
Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2005 34). The company’s management specifically listed the
importance of the annual defense budget. This reveals a trend that all the companies analyzed have
acknowledged the importance of the defense budget. This indicates how reliant the entire industry
is on the federal government, and how significant an increase in funding is for companies like
Boeing.
Raytheon
The final company to analyze is Raytheon. Similar to all of the companies analyzed during
this time, Raytheon’s financials experienced significant levels of growth throughout the 2000’s.
According to the company’s financial statements during this time, Raytheon was able to more than
double its net income over the three years analyzed (See figure 45). This is similar to the other
four companies analyzed during this time. The company’s management explained: “Within the
DoD budget, the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation budget and the Procurement budget,
collectively known as the investment accounts, are a key source of funding for the Company’s
programs. These investment accounts show continued growth throughout the FYDP” (Raytheon
Company. Form 10-K for Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2005 31). This signifies that the
company’s future revenue growth potential is high. Additionally, this also explains why the
company’s profits have been increasing in the past several years, indicating that the increased
budget in research has been driving the company’s profitability.
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The second factor to consider is the company’s return on assets over time. The company’s
return on assets more than doubled over the three years, indicating a trend that exists within all
five companies analyzed (See figure 46). The increased profitability of the company caused the
ratio to increase significantly in a short amount of time. Since Raytheon’s assets only increased in
small amounts during the time period analyzed, this suggests that the company was becoming more
efficient at being profitable.
The final factor to consider is the historical stock price of the company during this time
period. Similar to all companies analyzed, Raytheon’s stock price increased over the three years
analyzed (See figure 47). This further suggests an overall market trend that the defense industry
was significantly profitable as a result of increased defense spending during this time period.
Overall, Raytheon’s share price growth seems to indicate that the industry overall experienced an
upward trend as a result of increased profits over the time period.
Conclusion of 2000’s Analysis
The five companies that were analyzed from 2003 to 2005 reveal several key trends within
the defense industry. Over the three years, all five companies increased their net income by a
substantial portion, with two companies more than doubling their profits during this time. The
return on assets of the five companies analyzed further reveals that companies were able to make
their assets more profitable during this time. The ratio also underscores how rapid the growth in
profitability was for these companies. The final factor analyzed was the historical stock price of
the companies. All of the companies analyzed during this time had rising stock prices that
continued to rise for most of the decade. This seems to suggest an underlying trend within the
industry that the sudden increase in defense funding helped to grow the shareholder value of the
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companies analyzed. The increased funding to defense also seemed to correlate with the increased
financial performance of the defense industry.
Conclusion
After analyzing five companies over three decades several patterns have emerged. Defense
cuts made in the 1990’s were motivated by the fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent end of the
Cold War. Therefore, the cuts in discretionary spending made during this time specifically targeted
defense spending. The result from this is seen in the financial performance of the five companies
analyzed. All companies except for Raytheon experienced declining profits during the three years
analyzed in the 1990’s. The historical stock prices of these same five companies reveals that the
share prices experienced little to no growth during this time. Additionally, the defense cuts made
in the 2010’s were made in response to the Budget Control Act of 2011, which cut discretionary
spending in both defense and nondefense. The results on the defense industry were largely mixed,
with only three companies experiencing decreasing profits. The historical stock price of the
defense companies analyzed reveal that all companies experienced no growth in their share prices
during this time. The final decade analyzed, the 2000’s, showed significant increases in the profits
of these companies, along with significant growth in their share prices. Overall, it is reasonable to
suggest that the increase in funding for defense causes defense contractors to become more
profitable and increase their stock prices. Additionally, decreased defense funding for the federal
budget has mixed results. Decreases in discretionary funding that specifically target defense seem
to have a more significant impact on the financial performance of the defense industry, while cuts
to discretionary spending overall seem to have only a marginal impact on the financial performance
of the defense industry. For these reasons, increases to defense spending in the discretionary
budget are a determinant of the success of the defense industry.
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While these trends are seemingly prevalent within the defense industry, there are various
methods to mediate the sudden changes to the industry. The first suggestion for defense contractors
looking to avoid financial ruin is to diversify what products and services they offer. All of the
defense contractors analyzed stated how reliant they are on the U.S. government as a customer.
For this reason, if the companies were to offer a more diverse line of products, and branch out into
offering commercial products, the industry would not be as volatile. Additionally, another solution
to help avoid financial ruin is seen in the companies globalizing into new markets. Defense
contractors that have a larger global presence have access to a wider network of potential
customers, such as other foreign governments. Diversifying the company’s customer base would
ease any sudden change in defense spending in one country. These strategies combined would
allow defense companies to further their success. Additionally, diversifying would allow the
companies to increase their profitability more than they already have in the past three decades.
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Figures
Figure 1: Discretionary Spending Data
Year
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

Defense
52.6
53.7
55.0
51.0
59.0
72.0
82.2
82.7
81.9
79.0
79.3
77.1
80.7
87.6
89.9
97.5
104.6
116.8
134.6
158.0
185.9
209.9
228.0
253.1
273.8
282.5
290.9
304.0
300.1
319.7
302.6
292.4
282.3
273.6
266.0
271.7
270.3
275.5
295.0
306.1
349.0
404.9
454.1
493.6
520.0
547.9
612.4
656.7
688.9
699.4
670.5
625.8
596.4
583.4
584.8
590.2
622.7
676.4

Nondefense
19.5
21.6
24.1
26.8
31.1
34.5
35.8
34.6
38.3
43.5
49.2
53.3
57.5
70.3
85.7
99.6
114.1
123.2
141.7
149.9
140.0
143.4
151.4
162.7
164.7
161.6
173.5
184.8
200.4
213.6
231.2
247.3
259.1
271.2
266.8
275.4
281.7
296.7
319.7
343.0
385.0
419.4
441.0
474.9
496.7
493.7
522.5
580.8
658.3
647.7
605.2
576.6
582.4
588.8
600.4
610.1
638.9
660.0

Total
72.1
75.3
79.1
77.8
90.1
106.5
118.0
117.3
120.3
122.5
128.5
130.4
138.2
158.0
175.6
197.1
218.7
240.0
276.3
307.9
326.0
353.3
379.4
415.8
438.5
444.2
464.4
488.8
500.6
533.3
533.8
539.8
541.3
544.8
532.7
547.0
552.0
572.1
614.6
649.0
734.0
824.3
895.1
968.5
1,016.6
1,041.6
1,134.9
1,237.5
1,347.2
1,347.1
1,275.7
1,202.4
1,178.9
1,172.1
1,185.2
1,200.3
1,261.6
1,336.4
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Defense as
a % of
Total
72.91%
71.34%
69.55%
65.59%
65.45%
67.61%
69.63%
70.50%
68.12%
64.48%
61.72%
59.12%
58.41%
55.46%
51.19%
49.48%
47.85%
48.66%
48.72%
51.30%
57.04%
59.40%
60.10%
60.87%
62.44%
63.61%
62.64%
62.20%
59.96%
59.95%
56.69%
54.18%
52.14%
50.22%
49.92%
49.66%
48.96%
48.15%
47.99%
47.16%
47.54%
49.12%
50.73%
50.96%
51.15%
52.60%
53.96%
53.07%
51.13%
51.92%
52.56%
52.04%
50.60%
49.77%
49.34%
49.17%
49.36%
50.61%

Nondefense
Defense Decrease from Decrease from
Previous Year
Previous Year

Figure 1
DECREASE

DECREASE
DECREASE
DECREASE
DECREASE

DECREASE

DECREASE

DECREASE
DECREASE
DECREASE
DECREASE
DECREASE
DECREASE

DECREASE

DECREASE

DECREASE

DECREASE
DECREASE
DECREASE
DECREASE

DECREASE
DECREASE
DECREASE

Figure 2: Discretionary Spending Data During 1990’s
Figure 2
Year
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

Defense
319.7
302.6
292.4
282.3
273.6
266.0
271.7

Nondefense
213.6
231.2
247.3
259.1
271.2
266.8
275.4

Total
533.3
533.8
539.8
541.3
544.8
532.7
547.0

Figure 3: General Dynamics Income Statement 1990’s
General Dynamics
Figure 3
Net Sales
OPERATING COSTS AND EXPENSES
OPERATING EARNINGS
Interest, net
Other income, net
EARNINGS FROM CONTINUING OPERATIONS BEFORE INCOME TAXES
Provision for income taxes
EARNINGS FROM CONTINUING OPERATIONS
DISCONTINUED OPERATIONS, NET OF INCOME TAXES:
Earnings (loss) from operations
Gain on disposal
NET EARNINGS

Defense Decrease from
Previous Year
DECREASE
DECREASE
DECREASE
DECREASE
DECREASE

1995 1994
3,067 3,058
2,752 2,737
315
321
55
22
5
375
343
128
120
247
223
55
19
321

15
238

1993
3,187
2,878
309
36
68
413
143
270
(30)
645
885

Figure 4: General Dynamics Return on Assets 1990’s
General Dynamics
Total Assets
Net Income
Return on Assets

Figure 4

Figure 5: General Dynamics Historical Stock Price 1990’s

Figure 5
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1995
3164
321
11.00%

1994
2673
238
8.97%

1993
2635
885
28.71%

Figure 6: Northrop Grumman Income Statement 1990’s
Northrop Grumman
Figure 6
Sales
Operating Costs
Administrative and General Expenses
Special termination benefits
Operating Margin
Interest Income
Other, net
Interest Expense
Income before income taxes and cumulative effect of accounting principle changes
Federal and Foreign Income taxes
Income before cumulative effect of accounting principle changes
Changes in Accounting Principles
Retiree and Health Care Benefits
Net Income

Figure 7: Northrop Grumman Return on Assets 1990’s
Northrop Grumman
Figure 7
Net Income
Total Assets
Return on Assets

Figure 8: Northrop Grumman Historical Stock Price 1990’s

Figure 8
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1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
6,818 6,711 5,063 5,550 5,694
5,319 5,477 4,385 4,877 4,817
963
753
485
455
531
282
536
199
193
218
346
1
6
2
4
11
9
(31)
13
5
(137) (109)
(38)
(47)
(80)
409
65
170
180
277
157
30
74
59
9
252
35
96
121
268
21
88
252
35
96
121
201

1995
1994 1993
1992
252
35
96
121
5,455 6,047 2,939 3,162
4.38% 0.78% 3.15% 3.85%

Figure 9: Lockheed Martin Income Statement 1990’s
Lockheed Martin
Figure 9
Net sales
Costs and expenses:
Cost of sales
Merger related and consolidation
expenses
Earnings from operations
Other income and expenses, net
Interest expense
Earnings before income taxes and
cumulative effect of change in accounting
Income tax expense
Earnings before cumulative effect of
change in accounting
Cumulative effect of change in
accounting
Net earnings

1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
22,853 22,906 22,397 16,030 15,871
20,881

21,127

20,857

14,891

690
1,282
95
1,377
288

1,779
200
1,979
304

1,540
44
1,584
278

1,139
42
1,181
177

1,104
(49)
1,055
176

1,089
407

1,675
620

1,306
477

1,004
355

879
261

682

1,055

829

649

618

(37)
1,018

829

682
Figure 10: Lockheed Martin Return on Assets 1990’s

Lockheed Martin
Net Income
Total Assets
Return on Assets

(1,010)
(361)

14,767

618

1995
1994
1993
1992
682
1,018
829
(361)
17,558 17,979 17,082 10,827
3.84% 5.81% 5.94% -3.38%

Figure 10

Figure 11: Lockheed Martin Historical Stock Price 1990’s

Figure 11
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Figure 12: Boeing Income Statement 1990’s
Figure 12

Boeing
Sales and other operating revenues
Costs and expenses
Special retirement program expense
Earnings from operations
Other income, principally interest
Interest and debt expense
Earnings before federal taxes on income
Federal taxes on income
Net earnings

1995
19,515
18,613
600
302
209
-151
360
-33
393

1994
21,924
20,773
0
1,151
122
-130
1,143
287
856

1993
25,438
23,747
0
1,691
169
-39
1,821
577
1,244

Figure 13: Boeing Return on Assets 1990’s

Boeing
Net Income
Total Assets
Return on Assets

1995
1994
1993
1992
393
856
1,244
1,554
22,098 21,463 20,450 18,147
1.80% 4.08% 6.45% 9.12%

Figure 13

Figure 14: Boeing Historical Stock Price 1990’s

Figure 14
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Figure 15: Raytheon Income Statement 1990’s

Raytheon
Figure 15
Net sales
Cost of sales
Administrative and selling expenses (note A)
Research and development expenses
Total operating expenses
Operating income
Interest expense
Interest and dividend income
Other (income) expense, net
Non-operating income, net
Income before taxes
Federal and foreign income taxes
Net Income

1995
11,716
9,102
1,211
316
10,628
1,087
197
(46)
(255)
(104)
1,192
399
793

1994
10,013
7,753
912
270
8,935
1,078
49
(48)
(72)
(71)
1,150
391
759

1993
9,201
7,174
828
279
8,281
920
32
(57)
(103)
(127)
1,047
354
693

1995
793
9,841
9.20%

1994
759
7,395
10.36%

1993
693
7,258
10.44%

Figure 16: Raytheon Return on Assets 1990’s

Raytheon
Net Income
Total Assets
Return on Assets

Figure 16

Figure 17: Raytheon Historical Stock Price 1990’s

Figure 17
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Figure 18: General Dynamics Income Statement 2010’s
General Dynamics
Products
Services

Figure 18

Operating costs and expenses:
Products
Services
Goodwill impairment
General and administrative (G&A)
Operating earnings
Interest, net
Other, net
Earnings from continuing operations before income taxes
Provision for income taxes, net
Earnings (loss) from continuing operations
Discontinued operations, net of tax
Net earnings (loss)

2013
2012
2011
$ 19,371 $ 19,784 $ 21,440
11,847
11,729
11,237
31,218
31,513
32,677
15,296
16,228
17,230
10,158
10,182
9,591
1,994
2,079
2,276
2,030
27,533
30,680
28,851
3,685
833
3,826
(86)
(156)
(141)
8
(136)
33
3,607
541
3,718
1,121
873
1,166
2,486
(332)
2,552
(129)
(26)
$
2,357 $
(332) $
2,526

Figure 19: General Dynamics Return on Assets 2010’s

Figure 20: General Dynamics Historical Stock Price 2010’s

Figure 20
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Figure 21: Northrop Grumman Income Statement 2010’s
Northrop Grumman
Figure 21
Sales
Product
Service
Total sales
Operating costs and expenses
Product
Service
General and administrative expenses
Operating income
Other (expense) income
Interest expense
Other, net
Earnings from continuing operations before
income taxes
Federal and foreign income tax expense
Earnings from continuing operations
Earnings from discontinued operations, net of tax
Net earnings
Figure 22: Northrop Grumman Return on Assets 2010’s

Northrop Grumman
Net Income
Total Assets
Return on Assets

Figure 22

Figure 23: Northrop Grumman Historical Stock Price 2010’s

Figure 23
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2013

2012

2011

14,033
10,628
24,661

13,838
11,380
25,218

15,073
11,339
26,412

10,623
8,659
2,256
3,123

10,415
9,223
2,450
3,130

11,491
9,295
2,350
3,276

(257)
(3)
2,863

(212)
47
2,965

(221)
28
3,083

911
1,952
1,952

987
1,978
1,978

997
2,086
32
2,118

2013
2012
2011
1,952
1,978
2,118
26,381 26,543 25,411
7.38% 7.61% 7.45%

Figure 24: Lockheed Martin Income Statement 2010’s
Lockheed Martin
Figure 24
Net sales
Cost of sales
Other income, net
Operating profit
Interest expense
Other non-operating income (expense), net
Income tax expense
Net earnings from continuing operations
Net earnings (loss) from discontinued operations
Net earnings

2013
45,358
(41,171)
318
4,505
(350)
(1,205)
2,950
31
2,981

2012
47,182
(42,986)
238
4,434
(383)
21
(1,327)
2,745
2,745

2011
46,499
(42,755)
276
4,020
(354)
(35)
(964)
2,667
(12)
2,655

Lockheed Martin
2013
Figure 25
Net Income
2,981
Total Assets
13,329
Return on Assets
21.93%
Figure 26: Lockheed Martin Historical Stock Price 2010’s

2012
2,745
13,855
19.64%

2011
2,655
14,094
19.68%

Figure 25: Lockheed Martin Return on Assets 2010’s

Figure 26
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Figure 27: Boeing Income Statement 2010’s
Boeing
Figure 27
Sales of products
Sales of services
Total revenues
Cost of products
Cost of services
Boeing Capital interest expense
Total costs and expenses
Income from operating investments, net
General and administrative expense
Research and development expense, net
Gain on dispositions, net
Earnings from operations
Other income, net
Interest and debt expense
Earnings before income taxes
Income tax expense
Net earnings from continuing operations
Net (loss)/gain on disposal of discontinued
operations, net of taxes of $0, $2, ($4)
Net earnings

2013
2012
2011
$ 76,792 $ 71,234 $ 57,401
9,831
10,464
11,334
86,623
81,698
68,735
(65,640) (60,309) (46,642)
(7,553)
(8,247)
(9,097)
(75)
(109)
(149)
(73,268) (68,665) (55,888)
13,355
13,033
12,847
214
268
278
(3,956)
(3,717)
(3,408)
(3,071)
(3,298)
(3,918)
20
4
24
6,562
6,290
5,823
56
62
47
(386)
(442)
(477)
6,232
5,910
5,393
(1,646)
(2,007)
(1,382)
4,586
3,903
4,011
(1)
(3)
7
$ 4,585 $ 3,900 $ 4,018

Figure 28: Boeing Return on Assets 2010’s

Boeing
Net Income
Total Assets
Return on Assets

Figure 28

Figure 29: Boeing Historical Stock Price 2010’s

Figure 29
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2013
4,585
92,663
5.05%

2012
3,900
88,896
4.62%

2011
4,018
79,986
5.41%

Figure 30: Raytheon Income Statement 2010’s
Raytheon
Figure
Net sales
30
Products
Services
Total net sales
Operating expenses
Cost of sales-products
Cost of sales-services
General and administrative expenses
Total operating expenses
Operating income
Non-operating (income) expense, net
Interest expense
Interest income
Other (income) expense, net
Total non-operating (income) expense, net
Income from continuing operations before taxes
Federal and foreign income taxes
Income from continuing operations
Income (loss) from discontinued operations, net of tax
Net income
Less: Net income attributable to noncontrolling interests in sub
Net income attributable to Raytheon Company

2013

2012

2011

19,855
3,851
23,706

20,380
4,034
24,414

20,725
4,066
24,791

15,292
3,240
2,236
20,768
2,938

15,712
3,380
2,333
21,425
2,989

16,245
3,419
2,297
21,961
2,830

210
(12)
(17)
181
2,757
808
1,949
64
2,013
17
1,996

201
(9)
18
210
2,779
878
1,901
(1)
1,900
12
1,888

172
(14)
12
170
2,660
782
1,878
18
1,896
30
1,866

Figure 31: Raytheon Return on Assets 2010’s
Raytheon
Net Income
Total Assets
Return on Assets

Figure 31

Figure 32: Raytheon Historical Stock Price 2010’s

Figure 32
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2013
2012
2011
1,996
1,888
1,866
25,967 26,686 25,854
7.58% 7.19% 7.42%

Figure 33: General Dynamics Income Statement 2000’s
General Dynamics
Figure 33
Net Sales
Operating costs and expenses
Operating Earnings
Interest expense, net
Other income (expense), net
Earnings from Continuing Operations before Income Taxes
Provision for income taxes, net
Earnings from Continuing Operations
Discontinued operations, net of tax
Net Earnings
Figure 34: General Dynamics Return on Assets 2000’s
General Dynamics
Figure 34
Total Assets
Net Income
Return on Assets
Figure 35: General Dynamics Historical Stock Price 2000’s

Figure 35
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2005
2004
2003
21,244 19,119 16,328
19,047 17,175 14,886
2,197
1,944
1,442
(118)
(148)
(98)
21
(8)
3
2,100
1,788
1,347
632
583
368
1,468
1,205
979
(7)
22
25
1,461
1,227
1,004

2005
2004
2003
19,591 17,544 16,183
1,461
1,227
1,004
7.87% 7.28% 7.19%

Figure 36: Northrop Grumman Income Statement 2000’s
Northrop Grumman
Figure 36
Sales and Service Revenues
Product Sales
Service Revenues
Total Sales and Service Revenues
Costs of Sales and Service Revenues
Cost of Product Sales
Cost of service revenues
General and Administrative Expenses
Operating Margin
Other Income (Expense)
Interest Income
Interest Expense
Other, net
Income from Continuing Operations Before Income Taxes
Federal and Foreign Income Taxes
Income from Continuing Operations
Income from Discontinued Operations, net of tax
Gain (Loss) on Disposal of Discontinued Operations, net of tax
Net Income

2005

2004

2003

20,150
10,571
30,721

20,106
9,747
29,853

18,540
7,856
26,396

16,250
9,340
2,953
2,178

16,417
8,718
2,712
2,006

14,854
7,681
2,393
1,468

54
(388)
200
2,044
661
1,383
17
1,400

58
(431)
(18)
1,615
522
1,093
3
(12)
1,084

60
(497)
24
1,055
297
758
64
44
866

Figure 37: Northrop Grumman Return on Assets 2000’s
Northrop Grumman
Total Assets
Net Income
Return on Assets

Figure 37

Figure 38: Northrop Grumman Historical Stock Price 2000’s

Figure 38
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2005
2004
2003
34,214 33,303 33,022
1,400
1,084
866
4.15% 3.27% 2.30%

Figure 39: Lockheed Martin Income Statement 2000’s
Lockheed Martin
Figure 39
Net sales
Products
Services
Total Sales
Cost of sales
Products
Services
Unallocated Corporate costs
Total Costs

2005

Other income and expenses, net
Operating profit
Interest expense
Earnings before taxes
Income tax expense
Net earnings

2004

2003

31,518
5,695
37,213

30,202
5,324
35,526

27,290
4,534
31,824

28,800
5,073
803
34,676
2,537
449
2,986
370
2,616
791
1,825

27,879
4,765
914
33,558
1,968
121
2,089
425
1,664
398
1,266

25,306
4,099
443
29,848
1,976
43
2,019
487
1,532
479
1,053

Figure 40: Lockheed Martin Return on Assets 2000’s

Lockheed Martin
Total Assets
Net Income
Return on Assets

Figure 40

2005
2004
2003
27,744 25,554 26,175
1,825
1,266
1,053
6.85% 4.89% 3.96%

Figure 41: Lockheed Martin Historical Stock Price 2000’s

Figure 41
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Figure 42: Boeing Income Statement 2000’s
Boeing
Figure
Sales of products
Sales of services
Total revenues
Cost of products
Cost of services
Boeing Capital Corporation interest expense
Total costs and expenses

42

Income from operating investments, net
General and administrative expense
Research and development expense
Gain on dispositions, net
Goodwill impairment
Impact of September 11, 2001, recoveries
Earnings from continuing operations
Other income, net
Interest and debt expense
Earnings before income taxes
Income tax (expense)/benefit
Net earnings from continuing operations
Income from discontinued operations, net of taxes
Net (loss) gain on disposal of discontinued
operations, net of taxes
Cumulative effect of accounting change, net of taxes
Net earnings

2005
2004
2003
45,398
43,979
41,493
9,447
8,478
8,763
54,845
52,457
50,256
(38,082) (37,921) (35,562)
(7,767) (6,754) (8,230)
(359)
(350)
(358)
(46,208) (45,025) (44,150)
8,637
7,432
6,106
88
91
28
(4,228) (3,657) (3,200)
(2,205) (1,879) (1,651)
520
23
7
(3)
(913)
21
2,812
2,007
398
301
288
460
(294)
(335)
(358)
2,819
1,960
500
(257)
(140)
185
2,562
1,820
685
10
33
(7)
42
17
2,572
1,872
718

Figure 43: Boeing Return on Assets 2000’s
Boeing
Total Assets
Net Income
Return on Assets

Figure 43

Figure 44: Boeing Historical Stock Price 2000’s

Figure 44
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2005
60,058
2,572
4.42%

2004
56,224
1,872
3.36%

2003
55,171
718
1.31%

Figure 45: Raytheon Income Statement 2000’s
Raytheon
Figure 45
Net sales
Cost of sales
Administrative and selling expenses
Research and development expenses
Total operating expenses
Operating income
Interest expense
Interest income
Other (income) expense, net
Non-operating expense, net
Income from continuing operations before taxes
Federal and foreign income taxes
Income from continuing operations
Loss from discontinued operations, net of tax
Income before accounting change
Cumulative effect of change in accounting principle, net of tax
Net income
Figure 46: Raytheon Return on Assets 2000’s
Raytheon
Figure 46
Total Assets
Net Income
Return on Assets
Figure 47: Raytheon Historical Stock Price 2000’s

Figure 47
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2005
2004
2003
21,894 20,245 18,109
18,230 16,981 15,045
1,474
1,385
1,261
503
491
487
20,207 18,857 16,793
1,687
1,388
1,316
312
418
537
(52)
(45)
(50)
(13)
436
67
247
809
554
1,440
579
762
498
140
227
942
439
535
(71)
(63)
(170)
871
376
365
41
871
417
365

2005
2004
2003
24,381 24,153 24,208
871
417
365
3.59% 1.72% 1.49%
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